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Abstract
Uncertainty is ubiquitous in cognitive processing. In this study, we aim to investigate the ability agents possess to track and
report the noise inherent in their mental operations, often in the form of confidence judgments. Here, we argue that
humans can use uncertainty inherent in their representations of value beliefs to arbitrate between exploration and exploi-
tation. Such uncertainty is reflected in explicit confidence judgments. Using a novel variant of a multi-armed bandit para-
digm, we studied how beliefs were formed and how uncertainty in the encoding of these value beliefs (belief confidence)
evolved over time. We found that people used uncertainty to arbitrate between exploration and exploitation, reflected in a
higher tendency toward exploration when their confidence in their value representations was low. We furthermore found
that value uncertainty can be linked to frameworks of metacognition in decision making in two ways. First, belief confi-
dence drives decision confidence, i.e. people’s evaluation of their own choices. Second, individuals with higher metacogni-
tive insight into their choices were also better at tracing the uncertainty in their environment. Together, these findings
argue that such uncertainty representations play a key role in the context of cognitive control.
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Introduction
All cognitive computations are plagued by uncertainty (Bach and
Dolan 2012). On the one hand, uncertainty can be inflicted on our
cognitive systems through external sources, e.g. when we per-
ceive noisy information in the environment. On the other hand,
uncertainty can arise directly from the way the brain processes
information. Recent research has supported the view of a signal-
inherent representation of uncertainty, suggesting a coding
scheme in which the reliability of a signal is represented together
with its average strength (e.g. Ma et al. 2006; Ma and Jazayeri 2014;
Van Bergen et al. 2015). Such a coding scheme allows the decision
maker to more efficiently integrate new evidence by giving more
weight to a reliable evidence source and discounting information
from a source identified as unreliable. Such flexible weighting of
evidence might take place automatically and without agents be-
ing aware of it. A wealth of empirical work has found that
humans can accurately trace uncertainty and report the level of
confidence in their judgments (Peirce and Jastrow 1884; Henmon
1911; Audley 1960; Shea et al. 2014; Meyniel et al. 2015b;
Guggenmos et al. 2016). However, different sources of evidence
are by no means to be considered equal. A recent study by Boldt
et al. (2017) found that evidence reliability, operationalized as the
variability of colors in a stimulus array, affected confidence more
than evidence strength, operationalized as the distance of the av-
erage color from a decision boundary.
Classically, confidence has been investigated focusing on
only the last stage of the decision-making process, with confi-
dence reflecting the internal belief as to whether the chosen
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option was the “good” or “correct” one (e.g. Pleskac and
Busemeyer 2010; Baranski and Petrusic 1994; Fleming et al.
2010). At more conceptual level, Pouget et al. (2016) proposed
that we should make a distinction between decision confidence
that tracks the probability of an action to be correct, and cer-
tainty that indexes the degree of uncertainty in a representa-
tion. Following this theoretical proposal in this study, we
experimentally measure how these two quantities separately
evolve during learning. We define “decision confidence” as the
confidence that an action (e.g. choosing the most valuable ban-
dit) is correct. We define “belief confidence” as the agent’s inter-
nal readout of the uncertainty inherent to her belief about the
value of each bandit, related to the concept of “certainty” pro-
posed in the framework by Pouget et al. (2016). More specifically,
when people assign a value to an object on which they base
their preferences and choices, those beliefs can vary with regard
to how precise they are: on our first day at work, we might guess
that we will like our new job, but several months later our cer-
tainty in that belief might have increased, resulting in a highly
precise value belief representation. The study of decision confi-
dence reaches back to the early beginnings of experimental psy-
chology (e.g. Peirce and Jastrow 1884; Fullerton and Cattell 1892;
Griffing 1895; Henmon 1911). Much of this work had focused
perception and memory (Koriat et al. 1980; Nelson and Narens
1990; Gigerenzer et al. 1991; Baranski and Petrusic 1995; Hertzog
and Hultsch 2000; Pleskac and Busemeyer 2010). At the theoreti-
cal level, one of the most successful framework was proposed
by Douglas Vickers that defined confidence as the “balance of
evidence”, the difference between two dynamic accumulators
at the time of the choice (the so-called “Vickers race model”;
Vickers and Packer 1982). Recently, there has been a renaissance
of these seminal earlier lines of investigation and the study of
confidence has been moved beyond the context of perception
and memory to include (as in the present study) learning and
value-based choice (e.g. De Martino et al. 2013; Koriat 2013;
Lebreton et al. 2015; Meyniel et al. 2015a). Similarly, confidence
in attitudes and value beliefs has been investigated both with
behavioral (e.g. Brim 1955; Smith and Swinyard 1988) and recent
neuroimaging studies (Lebreton et al. 2015; De Martino et al.
2017). More recently, it has been shown that it is possible to
disentangle the contribution of certainty and confidence on
perceptual choice at the neurocomputational level (Bang and
Fleming 2018). However, how these two quantities interplay in
the context of value-based learning has not been studied. This
is of particular importance in this context of value-based
decision making, where choices are based on internally con-
structed beliefs about the value of two or more alternatives.
Does confidence in the value beliefs we hold have an effect
on our choices? And does such belief confidence feed into our
decision confidence?
Using a novel variant of a multi-armed bandit task, we show
that we can reliably measure how confidence in people’s beliefs
evolves over the course of learning. The aim of our study was 2-
fold. First, we investigate the links between people’s belief confi-
dence and decision confidence. The second goal of our study was
to investigate how an agent uses the explicit representations of
the uncertainty inherent in value representations (belief confi-
dence) to arbitrate between different behavioral strategies.
Previous research has highlighted the role of confidence signals
as internal teaching signals that support cognitive control
(Fernandez-Duque et al. 2000), learning (Guggenmos et al. 2016),
and social interactions (Bahrami et al. 2010). Here, we are focusing
on higher-order action selection, the so-called “exploration–
exploitation trade-off” (Schumpeter 1934; Sutton and Barto 1998;
Cohen et al. 2007; Kolling et al. 2012). Arbitrating optimally be-
tween exploration and exploitation is not trivial and different
algorithms for achieving a good balance between these extreme
behavioral strategies have been discussed in the machine learn-
ing literature. A principled and efficient way of arbitrating be-
tween these modes is to deploy exploration toward the options
or actions regarding which the agent is more uncertain (Gittins
and Jones 1974; Dayan and Sejnowski 1996). Experimental work
has shown that people can implement such sophisticated strate-
gies, which take into account the level of uncertainty in their en-
vironment (Daw et al. 2006; Frank et al. 2009), even if there are
substantial inter-individual differences (Badre et al. 2012).
Here, we present the results from two studies in which partici-
pants continuously faced two lotteries (two-armed bandits), each
associated with a different average outcome. The participants’
task was to maximize their earnings by choosing the most re-
warding bandit. Furthermore, participants had to rate the value
of the lotteries together with the confidence they held in this
value belief (belief confidence), which we predicted would guide
their choices. From time to time, participants were furthermore
asked to freely choose between the two lotteries and to rate how
accurate they regarded their choice (decision confidence). The
first experiment focused on the development of preferences and
confidence judgments over time. The second study focused on
the decision stage and the influence of belief confidence on the
trade-off between exploration and exploitation. Taken together,
our findings argue that the explicit representation of uncertainty
expressed through confidence report plays a key role in arbitrat-
ing between complex decision strategies.
Materials and Methods
Participants
In Experiment 1, we tested 22 participants, 20 of which were fe-
male, and 3 were left-handed. Participants’ ages ranged from 18
to 32years (M¼ 24.0). One participant had to be excluded because
during debriefing she reported that she had tracked the value of
the bandits with a piece of paper. The final sample therefore in-
cluded 21 participants. For Experiment 2, we tested 30 partici-
pants, 15 of whom were female, and 1 was left-handed. The
participants’ ages from Experiment 2 ranged from 19 to 34
(M¼ 26.4). No participants were excluded in this experiment.
For both experiments, all participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, were English-proficient, and
reported that they had no psychiatric or neurological disorders
or gambling addiction. All participants gave informed consent
and were reimbursed for their time (£10/h). Each session lasted
Highlights
• Humans use uncertainty to arbitrate between exploration and exploitation.
• Individuals with higher metacognitive abilities are better at tracing the uncertainty.
• Belief confidence in both the chosen and unchosen item impact on decision confidence.
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approximately 90min, including instruction and debriefing. In
addition, participants also received performance-dependent
rewards (Experiment 1: M¼ £8.82; min¼ £8.44; max¼ £8.97;
Experiment 2: M¼ £8.71; min¼ £8.17; max¼ £9.11). All proce-
dures were approved by the local ethics committee.
Task and procedures
Experiment 1 comprised 75% rating trials and 25% choice trials.
During rating trials, participants were first presented with the
outcome of one of the randomly chosen arms of the bandit.
They then had to rate the value belief associated with this arm
(average number of points that could be won from this ma-
chine) and their confidence in this estimate. We used a 2D grid
scale to collect these measurements. Value-belief judgments
ranged from 0 to 100 points, belief confidence judgments from
“guessing” to “very confident”. Participants were told that dur-
ing rating trials, they would observe another person gamble at
one of the two slot machines. We chose to use this cover story
to make the task more engaging for the participants (increasing
their motivation) and to stress that the two arms of the bandits
were independent by comparing them to actual separated slot
machines. Unbeknownst to the participant, this person chose
one of the slot machines randomly with equal probability.
During choice trials, participants could freely choose one of the
two arms of the bandit and were then asked to rate their confi-
dence in being correct in their choice before seeing the outcome
of the trial. Decision confidence ratings were given on a scale
that ranged from “guessing” to “very confident”. It should be
noted that with such a scale, participants are unable to report
any mistakes they detected in their own decisions. However, we
decided to use this scale since it was more intuitive and we rea-
soned that such mistakes were likely to be rare in this experi-
ment (participants gained a considerable amount of
information from rating trials and the task was not speeded).
Furthermore, we reasoned that the confidence for most choices
would likely be “guessing” or higher, and we wanted to maxi-
mize resolution with which decision confidence was measured.
Moreover, we wanted to match the decision confidence scale to
the belief-confidence scale. Points won on those trials contrib-
uted toward the final reimbursement sum participants received
after the experiment and they were instructed to carefully use
the information previously gained when making their choices.
Both trial types were intermixed randomly. Figure 1 shows an
example of three trials (two rating and one choice trial).
In total, participants completed 600 trials, grouped into
blocks of different lengths (20–60 trials long). Participants were
thus unable to predict how many evidence samples they would
be able to collect in the present block, allowing us to avoid the
possibility that they would adjust their risk-taking behavior
given how close they were to the end of the block (Kolling et al.
2014). For each block, beta distributions were taken to generate
the rewards of the two arms of the bandit. Beta distributions
can be parametrized by two positive shape parameters, a and b,
which were set to [(a¼ 1; b¼ 3), (a¼ 2; b¼ 3), (a¼ 3; b¼ 3), (a¼ 3;
b¼ 2), (a¼ 3; b¼ 1)] in the present study. Out of these five possi-
ble distributions, two were taken to generate the rewards in
each block. These parameter ranges were chosen so that the
resulting distributions had different skews away from uniform
while being unimodal. The resulting samples were multiplied
by 100 to achieve rewards bounded between 0 and 100 points.
Prior to the experiment, participants completed three practice
blocks, introducing them to choice and rating trials separately
(5 trials each) and together (20 trials). Importantly, all partici-
pants completed exactly the same blocks, shuffled with regard
to the order in which they appeared. The gamble outcomes that
participants were presented with were thus the same for every-
one, only dependent on their choices.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the task structure, showing a typical sequence of trials: people were faced with both rating (blue) and
choice (orange) trials. During rating trials, they observed outcomes randomly from one arm of the two-armed bandit, represented as squares.
Participants then rated the average value of this arm and their confidence in this value-belief estimate on a 2D grid. During choice trials, partic-
ipants freely chose one arm of the bandit, rated their confidence in this decision and were then shown the reward. In Experiment 1, 75% of tri-
als were rating trials and 25% trials were choice trials, with both trial types intermixed randomly. In Experiment 2, these proportions were
reversed.
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A key question we aimed to address with Experiment 2 was
whether people would use their belief confidence to arbitrate
between exploration and exploitation. While the high number
of rating trials (75%) in Experiment 1 allowed us to assess
whether such belief confidence was related to the learning pro-
cess in a meaningful manner, this design was ill-suited to inves-
tigate how people chose between exploration and exploitation.
This is primarily due to the high proportion of rating trials, in
which participants observed outcomes from both arms of the
bandit, which allowed them to form a good enough estimate of
the value of each arm of the bandit and making exploration un-
necessary. As a result, their choices should arguably mostly be
exploitative. In Experiment 2, which was highly similar to
Experiment 1, we therefore reversed the ratio of trial types with
most trials (75%) being choice trials. However, to allow insight
into the evolution of value estimation during learning, we also
collected a smaller percentage (25%) of rating trials, but for the
reason mentioned above in this new version we no longer let
participants observe the outcomes of these trials. During rating
trials, people now judged their value beliefs and belief confi-
dence for both lotteries. Which bandit had to be rated first was
randomly chosen by the computer and could not be predicted
by the participants. With a considerably larger number of choice
trails, we expected more exploration trials in this experiment,
i.e. trials in which people would not just classify their confi-
dence as “guessing” if asked, but instead knew that they had
chosen the lower-value option. The confidence scale was thus
extended to range from “low confidence” to “high confidence”
for this experiment, as is common practice in perceptual
decision-making studies where errors are more likely to be
detected albeit usually due to a different reason (responses are
speeded whereas here participants consciously chose the sub-
optimal decision option to gather information). If participants
were highly confident that they had made the suboptimal
choice, they would report that they had “low confidence” they
chose the optimal choice alternative on our scale. We made
sure participants understood how to use the scale by instructing
them carefully and allowing them to practice using this scale
before moving onto the main task. Participants were thoroughly
debriefed after the experiment and invited to comment on the
task and ask questions. Issues with the decision-confidence
scale were not raised. Prior to Experiment 2, participants com-
pleted two practice blocks, familiarizing them first with choice
trials (5 trials) and then with a combination of both choice and
rating trials (12 trials).
All testing was administered using a 24-inch monitor (16:9
aspect ratio) using the MATLAB toolbox PTB3 (Kleiner et al.
2007). Responses were given with an ordinary computer mouse.
Prior to the analyses reported in this study, we excluded on av-
erage 2.2% of choice trials from the analyses of Experiment 1.
Those were trials in which participants responded too slowly
(63r rule calculated separately for each participant to exclude
fast lapses and trials during which participants were most likely
distracted; min¼ 0.7%; max¼ 3.3%). The same held for 1.7% of
choice trials in Experiment 2 (min¼ 0.2%; max¼ 2.9%). No rating
trials were excluded.
Data analyses
The first set of analyses for Experiment 1 aimed to assess
whether our new paradigm accurately captured belief learning
over time. A second set of analyses assessed whether the uncer-
tainty inherent in those beliefs—our concept belief confidence—
constituted a meaningful judgment. We therefore attempted to
link belief confidence to the more traditionally used concept of
decision confidence using a linear, hierarchical regression model
to predict decision confidence. We included participants’ last
rated value-belief and belief-confidence ratings of both the cho-
sen and the unchosen option as fixed effects, as well as the inter-
action of these estimates. Moreover, three control variables were
included as fixed effects. The first variable was the objective ac-
curacy of a trial. Decision confidence is an agent’s subjectively
perceived accuracy of being correct. The objective accuracy of a
trial should thus positively predict confidence, with higher confi-
dence for correct trials. The second control variable were log-
transformed RTs, given the “time heuristic” that suggests that re-
action times (RTs) and confidence are negatively correlated
across trials (e.g. Audley 1960; Moreno-Bote 2010; Hanks et al.
2011; Kiani et al. 2014). The third and last control variable was the
number of the current trial within the block. We predicted that
people’s decision confidence would increase over the course of
each block, reflecting increasingly better choices. In addition to
these fixed effects, the data were modeled with a random inter-
cept and random slopes for all regressors. This regression model
was fit to data from choice trials only with the R package “lme4”
in combination with the R package “lmerTest.” The latter imple-
ments the Satterthwaite approximation, a formula that allows
calculation of pooled degrees of freedom from variances of sev-
eral independent normal distributions (Satterthwaite 1946),
which in turn allows calculation of P-value estimates (for more
detail see Schaalje et al. 2002). All predictors were z-transformed
prior to being entered into the model to obtain standardized re-
gression coefficients.
The key goal of Experiment 2 was to test for uncertainty-
driven exploration. Here, we define exploration as choice trials in
which participants chose the option they might reasonably be-
lieve to be lower-valued. Since value ratings for the individual
arms of the bandit were only collected during rating trials, we ex-
trapolated the current value rating for choice trials using the
measurement taken at the most recent rating trial. An explora-
tion trial is then defined as a trial in which the participant choses
the arm of the bandit they rated as yielding lower rewards,
whereas an exploitation trial is defined as choosing the option
rated to yield higher values. We then fitted a logistic, hierarchical
regression model to the choice-trial data of Experiment 2 to test
for uncertainty-driven exploration. The dependent, binary vari-
able expressed whether or not on the current trial people chose
the choice option that they had previously rated as having a
lower-value compared to the other option—our new operationali-
zation of exploration. We included participants’ last rated belief
confidence of both the higher- and the lower-value choice option
as fixed effects, as well as the interaction of these estimates.
Moreover, the difference in value (DV) for the choice options
(high minus low) was included as a fixed effect. In addition to
these fixed effects, the data were modeled with a random inter-
cept and random slopes for all regressors. This regression model
was again fit to data from choice trials only, using the R package
“lme4”. All predictors were z-transformed prior to being entered
into the model to obtain standardized regression coefficients.
In Experiment 2, we furthermore attempted to link inter-
individual differences in people’s ability to trace uncertainty to
their metacognitive efficiency. We obtained metacognitive effi-
ciency measures, M-ratio, by fitting second-order signal-detec-
tion theory models to participants’ decision confidence data
(Maniscalco and Lau 2012; Fleming and Lau 2014) using the
MATLAB package HMeta-d (Fleming 2017). This approach auto-
matically adjusts for differences in first-order performance. We
furthermore fitted hierarchical, linear regression models that
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predicted belief confidence from the variance and mean of past
outcomes, the current trial within the block, as well as the arm
of the bandit. The standardized beta weights of the influence of
the variance of past outcomes on belief confidence were used
as an indicator for the extent to which people were capable of
tracking uncertainty.
For the sake of simplicity, for all regression approaches in
this study we report coefficients from the model that fitted the
data best. However, a comprehensive list of models of varying
degrees of complexity (10, 5, or 6 models, respectively) and a for-
mal model comparison based on Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) scores is included the Supplementary Material,
Fig. S1, S2 and S3.
Results
Experiment 1
Participants formed value beliefs over time
In Experiment 1, we investigated how value belief and belief
confidence rating evolved over time. We assumed that partici-
pants would adjust their value-belief estimates with each sam-
ple of evidence, presumably getting closer to the true value over
time. At the same time, the level of confidence in these value
estimates should increase in the course of learning. We found
support for both of these predictions and address each in turn
here. First, as expected we found that participants’ value esti-
mates increased in accuracy over time. Value estimation accu-
racy was on average 11 points off during the first half of the
blocks, and only 8 points off during the second half. This differ-
ence in estimation errors was reliable, t(20)¼ 9.7, P< 0.001. This
overall pattern of improvement can furthermore be seen in
Fig. 2A, in which the gray hairline arrows are smaller for later
trials in the example block (darker colors) compared to earlier
trials (lighter colors). This figure furthermore shows that people
perceived the arms of the bandit as more similar at the begin-
ning of the block (the two traces are closer together) compared
to the end of the block.
Second, participants grew monotonically more confident in
their value estimates (belief confidence) over the course of
learning, Mearly¼ 0.36 vs. Mlate¼ 0.58, t(20)¼ 9.4, P< 0.001 (see
Fig. 2B). This increase in confidence is furthermore reflected in
the traces in Fig. 2A, where later judgments (darker colors) lie
closer toward the right end of the x-axis. However, the example
traces also show that belief confidence could sometimes sud-
denly decrease over the course of a block, as reflected, for in-
stance, in the two data points highlighted by asterisks in
Fig. 2A: the darker colored asterisk lies further to the left com-
pared to the lighter colored asterisk. Presumably, this happens
whenever the newly sampled evidence leads to a larger update
in value belief. Indeed, the larger the absolute difference be-
tween the currently observed outcome and the previously esti-
mated value for the respective arm of the bandit, the larger the
decrease in belief confidence, as reflected in individual correla-
tions that were negative for 20 out of 21 participants, rs0.46
and rs0.01, and reliable for 16 out of 21 participants
(Ps< 0.01). Interestingly, such behavior goes against how a
Bayesian agent would integrate information: every new piece of
evidence, no matter how “far” it lies from the prior should lead
to a reduction of the variance of the posterior (spread of the dis-
tributions in Fig. 3A). Our data therefore suggest that Bayesian
integration might not be a suitable model for belief confidence.
We explore this point in more detail in the Supplementary
Materials, where a type of Bayesian filter (a particle filter) is di-
rectly compared to three reinforcement learning (RL) models to
model people’s value learning and trial-by-trial updating of be-
lief confidence.
Taken together, these findings suggest the paradigm used
here is well suited to study the development of value beliefs
and belief confidence over time: participants’ value estimates
increased in accuracy and this was reflected in increases in be-
lief confidence.
Linking belief confidence to decision confidence
Having established that our paradigm reflects meaningful
changes in beliefs over time and uncertainty inherent in those
Figure 2. (A) Average traces of participants’ value belief and belief confidence ratings, given on the 2D grid scale for one example block. All rat-
ings are z-transformed within-subject and then averaged across participants to reduce inter-individual differences in the use of the rating
scales. The arm with the objectively higher rewards is shown in yellow to green (shown on 10 trials out of the block, corresponding to one data
point each) and the other arm in blue to purple hues (shown on 14 trials out of the block, corresponding to one data point each). The brightness
reflects the position of the data points within with block with brighter (yellow or blue) hues representing the earlier trials. The hairline arrows
reflect the mean reward, calculated from the observed outcomes (objective mean value of the past outcomes). The length of the arrows is
therefore proportional to the estimation error with longer arrows reflecting worse value estimates. (B) Belief confidence increased over blocks:
the x-axis shows trial quintiles, calculated within each block ranging from the first (1) to the last (5) fifth of trials in each block. Belief confi-
dence was z-transformed within-subject and then averaged across participants. The error bars reflect61 SEM.
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beliefs, we then aimed to investigate the link between people’s
(value) belief confidence—the key concept of interest in this
study—and decision confidence. We have previously shown
that decision confidence is a function of the DV (De Martino
et al. 2013). The schematic diagram in Fig. 3A outlines this find-
ing: two noisy value beliefs are represented as distributions,
with their distance reflecting the DV. In the present study, we
furthermore propose that belief confidence affects decision con-
fidence. Belief confidence is reflected in the spreads of the two
belief distributions; the narrower these distributions are, the
more confident people judged their decisions. We therefore fit-
ted a hierarchical, linear regression model to predict people’s
decision confidence from their value-belief and belief-
confidence ratings of both the chosen and unchosen arm of the
bandit, the interaction of these estimates, and three control var-
iables: the objective accuracy of a trial and log-transformed RTs.
The standardized regression coefficients for the fixed effects are
presented in Fig. 3B. We chose to present the best-fitting model
here based on BIC scores (BIC¼ 5293.9). However, a detailed
model comparison approach which included a range of models,
both more parsimonious and more complex, is included in the
Supplementary Materials. Some of these alternative models in-
cluded the position of the trial within a block as a regressor (log-
transformed).
As reported by De Martino et al. (2013), a larger DV was asso-
ciated with higher decision confidence, as reflected in the sig-
nificantly positive and negative regression weights for the value
of the chosen, b¼ 0.30, P< 0.001, and unchosen option,
Figure 3.Hierarchical regression model used to predict decision confidence. (A) Schematic figure showing the noisy value representation for two
objects. For the purpose of simplicity, each value belief is represented as a normal distribution with a mean (value belief) and a standard devia-
tion (belief confidence). For these two overlapping choice options, Option B has a higher value than Option A, and also a more precise value
representation (higher belief confidence). (B) Standardized, fixed regression coefficients from a hierarchical, linear regression model. Positive,
higher parameter estimates reflect that an increment in this variable led to an increment in decision confidence. The error bars, which are al-
most entirely hidden behind the disks, reflect 61 SEM. The light gray disks represent predictors linked to value, the dark gray disks represent
predictors linked to belief confidence, and the black disks represent control variables. (C and D) Depict the influence of the key predictors on
decision confidence for both value belief (C) and belief confidence (D). Lighter colors reflect higher levels of decision confidence. DV ¼ differ-
ence in value.
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b¼0.18, P< 0.001, respectively. These predictors furthermore
showed a small but reliable interaction effect, b¼ 0.04, P< 0.05.
Figure 3C depicts the influence of both value-belief regressors
on decision confidence as a 2D grid with lighter colors reflecting
higher simulated decision confidence.
Critically, being confident in their value estimates also made
people more confident in their decisions, both for the chosen,
b¼ 0.33, P< 0.001, and also the unchosen choice option, b¼ 0.17,
P< 0.001. The best-fitting model did not include an interaction
between these two predictors. However, the prediction pattern
formed by these two belief-confidence regressors is shown in
Fig. 3D.
Moreover, two control variables were included in these re-
gression models. First, the objective accuracy of the current trial
was a binary variable that affected decision confidence posi-
tively, b¼ 0.07, P< 0.001, as predicted. In other words, if partici-
pants picked the objectively higher-value option, they tended to
be more confident in their choices. Second, the faster a decision,
the higher people’s subjectively judged decision confidence,
b¼0.15, P< 0.001.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that our
experimental setup allowed us to track the evolution of value
beliefs over the course of learning and that belief confidence
reflects meaningful insight into such learning. We moreover
found that how certain people are in their value beliefs affected
their decision confidence, in support of our first hypothesis.
Experiment 2
Having established with the findings from Experiment 1 that be-
lief confidence constitutes a meaningful measure of value uncer-
tainty, and having linked belief confidence with decision
confidence, we then addressed another key question of this
study: would people use their belief confidence to arbitrate be-
tween exploration and exploitation? In Experiment 2, the propor-
tions of choice (75%) and rating trials (25%) were reversed to allow
for more exploration, whereas in Experiment 1, people often
gained a sufficient amount of information from the lower-value
bandit simply through observing outcomes during the rating tri-
als, thereby lowering the need for active exploration of that deci-
sion option during choice trials. Indeed, this new design largely
increased the number of trials in which the participants chose
the lower-value option: participants on average chose the subjec-
tively perceived lower-value option on 22.1% of all trials as
opposed to only 13.3% of all trials for the previous experiment—
supporting the view that they were exploring more.
Participants have meaningful insight into their gambling behavior
We first assessed whether decision confidence allowed any
meaningful insight into people’s choice patterns, having now
collected a considerably larger number of such choice trials.
People made decisions on average 822ms after the onset of the
trial and chose the higher-value bandit—given previously ob-
served outcomes—in on average 81.6% of all choice trials (this
percentage is calculated based on objective value outcomes and
not perceived value, as in the previous analysis). Overall, people
showed good resolution in their decision-confidence judg-
ments, i.e. their decision confidence varied with both the per-
centage of trials on which the higher-value option was chosen,
as well as average reward points. Indeed, error rates (defined as
the proportion of trials on which participants chose the lower-
value option) differed reliably across confidence bins, F(1.7,
49.3)¼ 107.9, P< 0.001, g2p¼ 0.79, with a reliable linear trend, F(1,
29)¼ 140.9, P< 0.001, g2p¼ 0.83, see Fig. 4A. The same held for av-
erage rewards across decision-confidence quintiles, F(4,
116)¼ 117.0, P< 0.001, g2p¼ 0.80, again with a reliable linear
trend, F(1, 29)¼ 301.4, P< 0.001, g2p¼ 0.91, see Fig. 4B.
Confidence-guided exploration
To test whether participants arbitrate between exploration and
exploitation based on their belief confidence, we fitted a hierar-
chical, logistic regression model to participants’ choice-trial
data. The model predicts the probability of choosing the lower-
value option (exploration) from the belief confidence of the
higher-value option, as well as the unsigned DV as a control
variable, which we defined as abs(VLVR). This model was iden-
tified as the best-fitting model from a formal model comparison
approach based on BIC scores, which we report in the
Supplementary Materials along with several other models. The
Supplementary Materials furthermore include the results from
a model that also includes belief confidence of the lower-value
option as a (non-significant) predictor as well as a (significant)
interaction between the two belief confidences (see also
Fig. 5A). However, this slightly more complex model did not fit
the data as well (BIC¼ 11 114.2) as the model presented here
(BIC¼ 10 923.9).
Critically, belief confidence of the higher-value option signif-
icantly predicted exploration, b¼0.59, P< 0.001. This effect
Figure 4. (A) Error rates and (B) average points won as a function of decision confidence. The data were binned according to decision confidence
quintiles, which were formed within-subject. Errors are defined as trials on which people deviated from the ideal-observer model, i.e. trials on
which they chose the arm of the bandit with so far the lower average in observed outcomes. All error bars are 61 SEM for the respective y-axis
values.
Confidence modulates exploration and exploitation | 7
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nc/article-abstract/2019/1/niz004/5486647 by Institute of C
hild H
ealth/U
niversity C
ollege London user on 29 M
ay 2019
was negative, expressing that participants tended to explore
more if their belief confidence was low, consistent with our pre-
diction. The unsigned DV furthermore modulated choice signifi-
cantly, b¼1.02, P< 0.001, and negatively: the larger the
absolute DV, the less participants chose to explore the lower-
value option as arguably the overlap of the two value represen-
tations was small. Figure 5B presents how the DV and belief
confidence of the higher-value choice option relate to explora-
tion, with brighter colors reflecting higher proportions of explor-
atory choices. DV and confidence in the higher-value option did
also interact reliably, b¼0.28, P< 0.001. The standardized,
fixed-effect regression coefficients are furthermore presented in
Fig. 5C. Together, these findings suggest that if the value repre-
sentation of the preferred option is noisier, people tend to ex-
plore the inferior choice option more, compared to when it is
precise. We thus conclude that belief uncertainty—as measured
through belief confidence judgments—guides the trade-off be-
tween exploration and exploitation.
Inter-individual differences in participants’ capability to track
uncertainty
The increase in choice trials allowed us to obtain reliable meas-
ures of people’s metacognitive efficiency—the accuracy of their
decision confidence judgments. The final question, which we
aimed to address with our study was whether the degree by
which people can accurately harness the level of uncertainty in
their beliefs through confidence relates to their metacognitive
efficiency, thus explaining some of the inter-individual variabil-
ity reported in the literature.
To estimate the former, we first fitted a hierarchical, linear
regression model simultaneously to all participants’ rating-trial
data to assess the degree to which belief-confidence estimates
were driven by the variability of the past, observed outcomes or
other control variables [mean of the past outcomes, the current
trial within the block (log-transformed), and the arm of the
bandit]. Included in this model were two-way interactions be-
tween all variables except for the arm of the bandit, as well as
the respective three-way interaction. A formal model compari-
son based on the BIC score (BIC¼ 17 231.2), this model fitted the
data best. A range of other models are presented in the
Supplementary Materials.
The standardized regression weights for the fixed effects of
all predictors are presented in Fig. 6A. This simple, normative
model of how beliefs should be formed over time constitutes an
ideal-observer model that can then be used to predict empirical
responses. The influence of outcome variance on belief
Figure 5. (A) Proportion of trials in which participants chose the lower-value option (exploration), as a function of the belief confidence of the
higher- and lower-value options. (B) Proportion of trials in which participants chose the lower-value option (exploration trials), as a function of
the belief confidence of the higher-value option and the DV. The dependent measure (exploration) is reflected in the color on the simulated
grid, with lighter colors reflecting more exploration trials. (C) Standardized, fixed regression coefficients from amixed-model logistic regression
model, predicting exploration. Positive, stronger parameter estimates reflect that an increase in this variable led to a larger tendency to ex-
plore. All error bars reflect61 SEM. DV ¼ difference in value.
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confidence was negative and reliably different from zero,
bsig¼0.37, P< 0.001. The more variable past outcomes were,
the less confident people became, consistent with our simple
ideal-observer model. The mean of past outcomes had a weak
positive, but also reliable influence on belief confidence,
bmu¼ 0.06, P¼ 0.04, the higher the outcomes people had ob-
served for this arm, the more confident they judged their
beliefs. The other two control variables, the current trial within
the block (log-transformed), blogtrial¼0.05, P¼ 0.46, and the
arm of the bandit, btrial¼0.02, P¼ 0.24, did not reliably predict
belief confidence. Out of all two-way interactions, only the in-
teraction between the standard deviation and mean of all previ-
ously observed outcomes was reliable, bsigmu¼0.14,
P< 0.001, as was the three-way interaction between standard
deviation and mean of all previously observed outcomes and
the current trial, bsigmu logtrial¼0.04, P< 0.01. None of the
other interactions were reliable, abs(bs)<0.014, Ps>0.54. Taken
together, these findings suggest that people updated belief con-
fidence similar to the simple ideal-observer model.
We then correlated the individual beta weights for the influ-
ence of outcome variance, bsig, with people’s metacognitive effi-
ciency, log(M-ratio). We found that participants who were
driven more in their belief-confidence estimates by the norma-
tive, ideal-observer belief confidence (outcome variance; i.e.
larger negative regression weight for beta outcome r) were
more metacognitively efficient (higher metacognitive efficiency
score), r¼0.37, P< 0.05. In other words, people who were bet-
ter at tracing the uncertainty present in the environment were
better at distinguishing their own “good” and “bad” decisions,
further linking the concepts of belief confidence and decision
confidence. There was no such relationship between the beta
weights for the influence of outcome mean, bmu, and metacog-
nitive efficiency, r¼ 0.02, P¼ 0.94.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that people use their be-
lief confidence to arbitrate between two extreme modes of be-
havior, exploration and exploitation. We moreover found that
people whose belief confidence matched that of an ideal ob-
server closer also showed better insight into their own deci-
sions, thus suggesting a link between uncertainty in the belief
representations (belief confidence) and decision confidence,
further shedding light on the internal signals and cues that give
rise to confidence in a value-based decision-making context.
Discussion
The present study used a novel variant of a bandit paradigm
that allowed tracking of belief formation over time. We found
that noisy value representations—especially regarding the
higher-value option—led participants to explore more. Such
uncertainty-guided exploration matches and further extends
previous findings of uncertainty-driven exploitation (e.g. Frank
et al. 2009; Badre et al. 2012). The key difference, however, was
that we have demonstrated that it is possible to directly mea-
sure the uncertainty that serves as a cue to action selection us-
ing confidence judgments. Previous studies, on the other hand,
have focused entirely on computational estimates of uncer-
tainty. Our findings are further strengthened by our explicit
measure of exploration. In previous studies, exploitation has
commonly been operationalized as the act of choosing the
same option compared to the previous trial—whether this is re-
ferring to discrete choice options (e.g., Kolling et al. 2012) or dif-
ferent decision strategies that are combined continuously (e.g.
Frank et al. 2009). However, such an operationalization is unable
to capture whether the agent chooses the option that he per-
ceives to currently yield the best outcomes (exploitation) or not
(exploration). Here, we defined as “exploration” a situation in
which people choose an option they explicitly rated as inferior.
Confidence-guided exploration takes its place alongside a
range of other findings that suggest that confidence forms a cor-
nerstone of cognitive control (for reviews see Nelson and
Narens 1990; Fernandez-Duque et al. 2000; Yeung and
Summerfield 2012, 2014; Shea et al. 2014). For instance, research
on metacognition in memory suggests that people use their in-
ternal, metacognitive signals to optimize learning, focusing on
items they feel least confident about (Nelson and Leonesio
1988), even when these metacognitive judgments were objec-
tively wrong (Metcalfe and Finn 2008; Hanczakowski et al. 2014).
Similarly, findings from the error-monitoring literature suggest
that people commonly slow down after committing an error
(Rabbitt 1966), suggesting that they adopt a more accuracy-
focused response regime to avoid further mistakes (Dutilh et al.
2012). Relatedly, confidence has been shown to serve as an in-
ternal teaching signal to support learning (Guggenmos et al.
2016) and metacognition has been proposed as a mechanism to
guide people’s decisions to cognitively offload by setting
Figure 6. (A) Standardized, fixed regression coefficients from a hierarchical, linear regression model. Positive parameter estimates reflect that an
increment in this variable led to an increment in belief confidence. The error bars, which are almost entirely hidden behind the disks, reflect
61 SEM. The black disks represent predictors linked to the observed outcomes and the gray disks represent control variables and interaction
effects. (B) Regression weights for the variance of past outcomes (ideal-observer model confidence) for each participant plotted against their
metacognitive efficiency. r¼ standard deviation; l¼mean.
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reminders to avoid memory failures (Risko and Gilbert 2016).
The notion that representations of uncertainty can be used by
the brain to optimize behavior therefore extends and augments
previous findings and discussions on metacognition.
We found that belief confidence predicted exploration in a
linear way: the more uncertain people judged their value
beliefs, the more likely they were to explore respective choice
options. This finding is seemingly at odds with studies and the-
ories that suggest confidence is related to curiosity in an inverse
u-form shape (Kang et al. 2009; for a review of these findings see
Butlin 2010). However, it should be noted that these studies
used a full confidence scale, i.e. a scale that reaches from 0%
confidence (certainly wrong) over 50% confidence (guessing) to
100% confidence (certainly correct). In our study, belief confi-
dence ratings were given on a scale ranging from 50% to 100%
confidence. We chose this scale because we collected value be-
lief and belief confidence ratings concurrently and therefore did
not expect any error detection. These findings can thus be rec-
onciled considering only the curiosity ratings for the upper half
of the scale used in Kang et al. (2009).
Our study furthermore linked the concept of (value) belief
confidence, to the more traditionally studied concept of deci-
sion confidence. We found that participants with more accurate
insight into their decisions tended to be driven more by the vari-
ability in their experienced outcomes in their belief confidence.
Relatedly, we found that belief confidence had an effect on how
some people judged their choices. Critically, this was found not
only for the chosen option (being certain regarding the higher
value of the option participants selected increased their deci-
sion confidence) but also for the belief confidence of the
unchosen option: being certain about the value of the decision
alternative people chose to forgo also increased their decision
confidence. This finding fits and extends previous studies that
reported that humans are capable of tracking counterfactual
choice options (Boorman et al. 2011; see also Domenech and
Koechlin 2015).
The finding that the belief confidence of both choice options
affects decision confidence furthermore extends and links to
previous results from our lab. In an initial study, we found that
confidence in a value-based binary decisions (i.e. decision confi-
dence in the current framework) was associated with activity in
both the ventro-medial and the rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC and rlPFC) (De Martino et al. 2013) in which the former
tracked both DV estimates and confidence and the latter only
confidence. In a subsequent study (De Martino et al. 2017), in-
stead of using binary choice we elicited confidence into value
estimates (i.e. belief confidence according to the taxonomy used
here) we found again an involvement of vmPFC (expanding into
dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, dmPFC, according to a func-
tional gradient) but no confidence signal in rlPFC. In light of the
results presented here, we are tempted to suggest a possible
dissociation of roles these two regions might play in the readout
of uncertainty. In the choice study (De Martino et al. 2013), par-
ticipants repeatedly chose between different snack items pre-
sented on screen, reporting their decision confidence with
every choice, whereas value beliefs and belief confidence were
not measured. Given the tight link between belief confidence in
the chosen item and decision confidence that we showed in the
present study, it is possible that the vmPFC activations that
were observed in the binary choice study (De Martino et al. 2013)
are mainly reflections of belief confidence (i.e. the uncertainty
into the value estimation). This possibility is consistent with a
subsequent finding in which belief confidence was directly
measured in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study and in which activity in vmPFC was identified (De
Martino et al. 2017; but see also Lebreton et al. 2015). An intrigu-
ing possibility is that rlPFC is involved only in decision confi-
dence (or the subsequent use of such for the purpose of
cognitive control; cf. Badre et al. 2012), i.e. when participants are
requested to explicitly report the probability of an action to be
correct. This matches the notion that the rlPFC is involved in
the readout of metacognitive reports (usually measured in
choice and not in estimation tasks), and it is supported by find-
ings that show that coupling strength of the rlPFC with vmPFC
is predictive of how efficiently uncertainty is read out for the
metacognitive report (De Martino et al. 2013), as well as that gray
matter volume in this area correlates with participants’ meta-
cognitive accuracy (Fleming et al. 2010; for a review of the role of
rlPFC in metacognition also see Fleming and Dolan 2012). This
would suggest that low-level representations of uncertainty
(measured by belief confidence here) are inherent to the compu-
tation performed by the cortical regions such as vmPFC for
value beliefs (De Martino et al. 2013, 2017) or visual cortex for
perceptual estimation (Fleming et al. 2012). However, following a
choice, the uncertainty inherent in these low-level representa-
tions, together with uncertainty arising during the decision pro-
cess such as response speed (Kiani et al. 2014) or familiarity and
fluency (Koriat 1997) can in turn inform metacognitive reports
that are instantiated in rlPFC.
In the present study, we proposed that belief confidence
arises from the belief updating process, both of which we mea-
sured using explicit ratings. Belief confidence is likely to reflect
both the stochasticity inherent in the lotteries (risk), as well as
epistemic uncertainty, which decreases gradually through
learning. Relatedly, a recent study by Meyniel et al. (2015a) pro-
posed a learning paradigm that allows studying the develop-
ment of confidence over time: participants were presented with
a sequence of one of two possible stimuli. From time to time,
participants had to estimate the probability that they were cur-
rently in a hidden state, which generated these stimuli with dif-
ferent probabilities and their confidence regarding the
correctness of their probability judgment. Meyniel et al. (2015a)
found that people were able to trace the evolving transition
probabilities and that their confidence judgments reflected the
uncertainty inherent in such a learning process, stemming from
both the inherent stochasticity of the task, insufficient expo-
sure, as well as the sudden transitions of states that happened
throughout the experiment, bearing some similarities to the
concepts of expected and unexpected uncertainty (e.g. Yu and
Dayan 2005).
Furthermore, Bang and Fleming (2018) recently published a
relevant fMRI study on the link between evidence certainty and
decision confidence, that was similarly inspired by the concep-
tual proposal of Pouget et al. (2016). The authors used a random
dot motion task and manipulated dot coherence to affect the re-
liability of the sensory evidence. Importantly, they found that
certainty was encoded in posterior parietal regions, whereas
decision confidence was encoded in medial prefrontal regions.
The finding that different brain regions reflect these different
representations of uncertainty are further support for the no-
tion that the brain represents a multifaceted confidence system,
the architecture of which we are only just beginning to grasp.
The work presented here provides a suitable setup to study
these two quantities in the context of value-based learning and
furthermore demonstrates how these quantities influence
learning. Future research might be able to capitalize on our par-
adigm to investigate whether belief confidence and decision
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confidence in the context of value-based decision making show
a similar double dissociation at the neural level.
To conclude, our results provide a novel account of how
uncertainty in value-belief judgments is constructed over time,
and how people arbitrate between exploration and exploitation,
with an uncertainty bonus biasing people toward exploration
for the purpose of further information seeking (e.g. Daw et al.
2006; Frank et al. 2009). We suggest that our results carry impli-
cations for how the precision in the value representation for
the chosen and unchosen option feeds into decision confidence,
suggesting that uncertainty in the value-belief representations
(belief uncertainty) also affects how confident people judge
their choices, with higher decision confidence if decisions were
based on precisely represented values of both the chosen and
unchosen choice option. We showed that people who were
better capable of tracing the uncertainty inherent in the envi-
ronment also possessed higher metacognitive insight into their
decisions. Our results therefore argue for a complementary role
of decision and belief confidence judgments.
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